Abstract. We analyse the determinants of ministerial hazard rates in the UK from . We use Prime Minister fixed effects to control for some of the key aspects of the relationship between ministers and the Prime Minister. We also control for a number of background variables such as the level and type of education of the minister. We show that these effects work mainly through partisan differences in the composition of the cabinet. Conditioning on these factors we look at key aspects of the Prime Minister's patronage and the effects on a minister's durability. Our evidence shows that ministers who return to government have greater durability as do those with higher ministerial rank. We suggest that these effects are due more to ministerial quality than to to other underlying factors such as the loyalty of the minister to the Prime Minister. The effect of rank is greater for Conservative than Labour ministers. We conjecture that this reflects the hierarchical nature of the Conservative party over the period of investigation. 
Introduction
Jean Blondel's (1985, p. 8) comment that the 'study of ministers and ministerial careers is in its infancy' is no less true today than when he wrote it. Of course there have been biographical studies of the careers of ministers, and some, including former ministers (notably Kaufman 1997) , have considered what the ministerial role entails. Headey's (1974) idiosyncratic study of the behaviour and role of ministers in the 1960s is still the most comprehensive study of ministers in Britain. However, there few studies of ministerial behaviour that are not directly related to the relationship between the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet colleagues. To some extent this reflects the central importance of the Prime Minister, but that central role does not entail that ministerial careers are not an interesting study in their own right. Indeed, since policy making in the British system is the prime function of government departments, rising to ministerial office represents the height of ambition for most backbenchers. Yet we know little about what determines which ministers are successful.
In this paper we focus on ministerial durability in the British government in the post-war period providing a map of the terrain and showing some systematic features overlooked in more qualitative analyses.
The major drawback in studying ministers systematically, certainly in the UK, is the lack of data. We have plenty of stories to draw upon, and there is a wide-ranging analysis of the differing styles of Prime Ministers and the problems the various governments faced in the post-war period (see for example Hennessy 2001) . But there is a lack of systematic analysis of ministerial behaviour and there is no analysis of ministerial tenure. This paper is based on a data-set which records the length of tenure for all ministers in the UK from 1945-1947. 1 The data records the full employment record (dates and departments) for each minister, his or her rank (cabinet ministers, minister of state, junior minister or whip), the government and Prime Minister under which s/he served as well as various personal characteristics (education, gender, date of birth, and whether an elected MP or an non-elected member of the House of Lords).
Length of tenure is, of course, a key indicator of the success of a minister, though by no means the only one. All things equal, one might expect that more able performers would last longer than less able ones, but even able performers are subject to scandal and policy failure and, in the final event, must face the judgement of the electorate on the government as a whole. Moreover, many capable people have been overlooked for political office by prime ministers due to personal or political animosity, and none-too-few incompetents have been kept in office by prime ministers through friendship or loyalty.
To analyse length of tenure we look at the duration of each ministerial spell. There are two aspects of duration which may be of interest: how long a minister remains in one job, that is the length of time until a minister is re-shuffled; and the length of time the minister serves as a member of government. This paper is about the latter but we examine the effects of experience in office upon duration. A ministerial spell then begins at the time point when a minister enters the government and ends when one of two events occur 1) the minister leaves the government and 2)the term of government comes to an end. Some ministers will have relatively short spells and are replaced early on in their tenure, others will remain in government until the end of the term. Our primary concern in this paper is to highlight effects which may increase a minister's durability that is the likelihood that a minister will survive each day. Our approach follows on from previous work concerning the durability of governments (King et al. 1990) . Analogously to that literature we believe that there are random shocks which may lead to the termination of a ministerial spell but also that there are characteristics of individual ministers and the government which enhance a minister's survival capacity.
As in the work on government duration we model the stochastic element of ministerial tenure whilst taking into account effects are fixed at the time of the minister's entry into government. The precise question we ask in our statistical analysis is what is the likelihood that a ministerial spell will end at any point in time since the minister's appointment, given how long s/he has lasted thus far. This type of question is not well answered using standard least-squares regression, but duration models are now widely used in political science and these have a number of desirable features as discussed by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) .
We use the Cox proportional-hazards model which allows us to model the stochastic element without making restrictive assumptions about time-dependence. The model assumes that the effect of a change in the independent variable has a proportional effect on the hazard rate. This proportionality assumption is violated if the shape of the hazard rate differs across different groups of ministers. However, since we control for a rich set of fixed effects the proportional hazards model provides a reasonable first stab at assessing the direction and magnitude of these effects.
The first set of fixed effects we condition upon are the minister's educational background, age and gender. The second set focus on political characteristics. These include the size of the government majority at the time the government formed, 2 the experience of government that each minister brings with him, and the party identity of the government in which the minister serves.
3 Our analysis also conditions on Prime Ministerial fixed effects. Central executive studies in the UK have almost exclusively focussed on the role of the Prime Minister in directing his or her cabinet. This is largely due to the fact that, whilst power is concentrated into hands of a modern British Prime Minister, each Prime Minister has used that power in different ways. The relationship between the Prime Minister and her cabinet has been much written upon in the history books. Clearly the conditions under which a Prime Minister selects his or her ministers, as well as the personal characteristics of the Prime Minister will be a key determinant of a ministerial tenure. Whilst we survey some of the more salient aspects of this relationship and how they have been viewed by political historians, it is our view that many aspects of interest to political scientists are lost when focussing only upon the effects of individual Prime Ministers and the particular historical circumstances of their governments. The statistical analysis used here allows us to condition on some of these features whilst highlighting systematic aspects of the resignation process which shed light upon the workings of ministerial government. Using fixed-effects for the Prime Minister and Prime-Minister's term allows us to focus our attention on the key aspects of the relationship between the Prime Minister and her individual ministers.
The key aspect of this relationship is the Prime Minister's power of patronage, notably of the one hundred or so politicians drawn from the House of Commons and House of Lords that form the government. Central to the government is the twenty or or so cabinet ministers.
2 The size of the government majority is of course not fixed. However changes in the size of the majority are marginal whilst coding for each change in majority would require coding for each minister at every instance of an MPs death or resignation or crossing the floor, and every by-election result. Since majorities on each such occasions are highly correlated with majority at the start of a party's term in government we treat this as a fixed effect.
3 For the years we are considering virtually all ministers belong to the party that is the party of government. chances, and at the senior level, ministers must be careful not to turn down job offers unless they are forever passed over altogether.
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We focus on two critical aspects of the Prime Ministers power of patronage. The first is the decision to bring back into government someone who has previously served as a minister. All of these ministers will have lost their jobs previously and many will have lost their jobs due to some policy failure or personal scandal. Some of those returning ministers will be ones who resigned due to individual ministerial responsibility. In the post-war period the average time in any one ministerial job is around two years, so ministers do not have long to acquaint themselves with the requirements of their role, and many commentators have complained that this leads to inefficiency in British government. Some have complained that the lack of time that ministers have to get on top of their brief gives greater power to civil servants; others have suggested it is a ploy of Prime Ministers to try to ensure that rivals cannot sustain a power base -Gordon Brown's recent long tenure at the Treasury might be a testament to the truth in that claim. 6 Such was the fate of John Cronin in 1964 (Kaufman 1997, p. 9) .
when their party is returned to government. For whatever reason these ministers left the government, whether due to individual or collective failings, the fact that they are invited to return to the fold provides an important signal as to latent traits which affect that ministers durability. The set of these traits include aspects of the personal and political relationship between the Prime Minister and minister and also include the minister's quality. For the political fixed effects we find a number of interesting results. As might be expected ministers serve in governments with larger majorities also have greater durability, indicating that party strength can contribute to the length of ministerial tenure. As mentioned partisan effects are also present with Labour ministers having, on average, a higher hazard rate. This may indicate that Labour ministers are more prone to the condemnation of their own backbenchers since criticism from one's own party is far more damaging than criticism from the opposition (Dowding and Kang 1998). 7 There is also an interaction between these effects.
A large party majority is a valuable resource for a minister only if these backbenchers are loyal to their government members. We find that the impact of majority size is greater for Conservative ministers than Labour ones. This partisan effect of majority size may indicate a latent 'loyalty' to the party in government that is stronger in the Conservative than in the Labour party.
7 Of course, this partisan effect may also reflect the fact that Labour ministers receive more scrutiny from a press which until Blair has reflected a Conservative bias.
rank. These factors reveal the more subtle elements affecting shifts in ministerial hazard rates. We find that returning to government adds to a minister's durability. Our estimates also support the conjecture that this is due to the underlying quality of the minister involved, rather than being due to due to other aspects of the relationship between the minister and Prime Minister such as loyalty and/or friendship. We also find that higher ministerial rank has a positive effect on durability. This supports the idea that quality counts. Those who are best able to cope with ministerial responsibilities should rise through the ranks more quickly and this personal characteristic should enhance a minister's durability. The effect of rank is stronger for Conservative ministers than Labour ones.
As well as a specific contribution to understanding the mechanics of British cabinet government our analysis contributes to the broader literature on key aspects of government duration. The literature that examines the forces and stresses of government breakup or cabinet instability has concentrated upon multi-party coalitions (though some comparative studies include countries with single-party majorities). And, whilst there is a growing literature on government durability, relatively little has been written about the durability of ministers themselves. However, strong single-party government also faces stresses which can be examined through ministerial turnover. There is an increasing interest in the systematic analysis of such ministerial turnover (Dowding and Kang 1998; Dumont De Winter and Dandoy 2001; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2003; 2004; Dewan and Dowding 2005) . And as noted by Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2004) in their study of ministerial tenure in the French Fourth Republic, high rates of government turnover need not imply high rates of ministerial turnover. Moreover, the literature that examines legislative careers (for example Best and Cotta 2000) has not looked systematically at ministerial durability.
ANALYSIS
We have gathered data on all ministers in the UK from 1945-97. Each minister is coded according to department, rank, and the government/Prime Minister that s/he served under for each spell. Thus the ministers movements across ranks and departments can be tracked.
The minister is also coded for date of birth, education, gender, and whether not s/he is ennobled in each spell. We do not use the departmental information in this paper. Statistical analysis of durations such as the length of tenure, relies on the hazard rate, the hazard function and and the corresponding survivor function.
Suppose we represent the length of a ministers tenure as a random variable indicated by T which has a continuous probability f (t) and cumulative probability is given by
From this we can derive the survivor function which is simply
and by definition of a density function we have that
The hazard rate is the rate at which ministerial spells are completed after a time t has elapsed. The ratio has two components, the probability that event occurs and the length of the relevant time interval. The hazard rate is obtained by taking the limit
These expressions provide a straightforward equation for the relationship between hazard function in terms of the survivor function and hazard rate. The hazard function can be written as f (t) = S(t)λ(t). Similarly we have a solution for the survivor function in terms of the hazard rate which is
We graph the hazard and survivor functions for our sample of ministers in the following section.
Descriptive Analysis of Tenure.
In all, our analysis spans 19 terms from the first Attlee administration until the end of John Major's second term. Table 1 presents mean durations and other average characteristics of our sample of ministers by the rank of the minister. Average tenure is longer the further up the ministerial ladder you climb. The average ministers in each of these ranks are broadly similar according to the characteristics we evaluate. As expected, cabinet ministers are older on average, some 9 years older than junior ministers, indicating that seniority brings its rewards in the British system of government also. Mean survival time is likely to be skewed due to some ministers having very short tenures and others seeing out their terms. The median survival time, that is the 50th percentile of the survivor function, may be more informative. Fifty percent of those entering government as cabinet ministers survive 43 months or more; the remaining 50 percent resign before the 43 month period. By contrast, fifty percent of whips have tenure longer than 33 months.
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[ Table 1 Here]
11 If they appear in Butler and Butler (2000) , then virtually all ministers as we define them are included in our sample. Reasons for exclusion include lack of information on age or inconsistencies in Butler and Butler that we were not able to rectify from other sources. Where the term is very short, for example in 1950-51, 1955, 1963-64, 1974, 1974-76, 1990 , then the survivor function has a very different shape to when the prime minister has had a full term of between 4 and 5 years. In the former cases the survivor function is relatively ed 1998, King ed 1998). In comparing the graphs for these administrations we find that for the Heath government more than half the ministers had lost their jobs within the first three years; for the Major government this benchmark was reached within 25 months of the beginning of the term.
More generally, one might suggest that these graphs illustrate the extent to which the Prime
Minister was in control of events. A Prime Minister in control of events may stabilize the ship in the run in to the election, hence the decrease in the rate at which the survivor function falls at around 4 years. But of course this has not always been the case. Major certainly hung on as long as he could till 1997 since the polls were bad, and he was hoping the economy (or something) would turn in his favour. Callaghan was also in severe difficulties, and had surprised everyone by not calling an election in the Autumn of 1978. However, there is no general pattern discernable across these nineteen pictures. We rather see these pictures as reflecting the particular history of each government, and the particular personality of the prime minister trying to orchestrate her cabinet in light of the problems and challenges she faced. Thus these nineteen graphs illustrate the hazards of being a minister within nineteen histories all much written about. For the rest of the paper we take the peculiarities of each prime ministerial term as given and concentrate upon more structured features determining ministerial tenure.
Ministerial Composition of Government.
In this section we provide a brief overview of the key variables in our analysis and how the composition of the government has changed over the years in regard to these variables. 
where λ 0 (t) is the minister's baseline hazard at t and X is a vector of characteristics which may affect a minister's durability. From this expression, the baseline hazard is the hazard rate when all measures of characteristics which may affect a minister's durability are recorded as zero.
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[ Table 3 About Here]
The first column in Table 3 presents hazard estimates for this model using some of the background variables which are fixed at the time of entry to government. As expected, the hazard rate is lower for those who have been to public school (13 percent)and those who have been to Oxbridge (15 percent). Otherwise we find no effect for our education categories. Age has a small positive effect in this regression (2 percent). The most surprising result in this regression is the estimate for experience which shows that an additional year of experience upon entering the government increases hazard by around 10 percent. Ministerial rank has the expected effect with ministers of lowest rank having a hazard rate some 150 percent 13 It is also worth noting that the distinctions are maintained at full cabinet level. In terms of the full cabinet whereas only half of Attlee's initial twenty ministers had attended university (five going to Oxbridge), twenty of Majors initial twenty-two went to university (seventeen to Oxbridge). It is also worth noting that it was not unusual for all the cabinet ministers to have been to public schools in some of the early Conservative administrations, indeed ten of Eden's 18 cabinet had been to Eton, and even six of Thatcher's first cabinet had attended that school (and two of Attlee's had also been to Eton). See Butler and Butler 2000, p. 71. 14 Using the proportional hazard framework we can write the survivor function as
where Log(H it ) is the integrated baseline hazard at t.
higher than the highest ranking ministers who are members of the cabinet. However in this regression, returning to government has no effect.
Column 2 introduces some of the political variables which are fixed at the time of entry into government namely the party in power, the (Log of) majority size and the number of terms served by the Prime Minister. Ministers serving in Labour administrations have a higher hazard by around 16 percent whereas majority size decreases the hazard rate. Interestingly, when controlling for this factor none of the educational variables has statistical significance.
This highlights the fact, already illustrated in Table 2 , that the composition of the cabinet in terms of educational background is closely related to the partisan composition of the government.
The third column in Table 3 The fact that the Prime Minister chooses to bring back a minister may then be a 'signal' of latent traits possessed by that minister. Which latent traits are at work is not straightforward to identify. However, we are able to distinguish between some of these traits since some may be a product of an ongoing relationship between the minister and Prime Minister. In order to see if the driving force behind returning and durability is loyalty and friendship or quality we examine the differences between durability and returning between a Prime
Minister's first term and later terms. If latent factors such as friendship and loyalty are most important we might expect the relationship to strengthen over time as a Prime Minister serves consecutive terms. However, if quality is the driving force, then we should not expect to see any difference in the relationship between returning and durability in first time and consecutive term premierships. In fact we find that the effect of returning is very similar for both types which suggests that quality is the driving force of the result. Comparing the estimate of returning in column 5 with the previous estimates in column 3 we find that the estimates are broadly comparable. When looking only at the estimates of returning under first-term Prime Ministers we obtain a 34 percent reduction in the hazard rate, which compares to a 36 percent reduction when looking at all returning ministers.
The same analysis applies to the effect of ministerial rank. We find that ministers of higher rank are more durable. Ministers of cabinet rank having the longer ministerial tenure than junior ministers or whips. 15 As in the previous discussion, one should not think of the longer tenure of such ministers as an indicator of their quality. Rather the fact that they were promoted through the ranks is a signal of their quality which in turn leads to longer tenure. However, aspects of the personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the Minister may also play a role. Even poor quality ministers might be promoted due to loyalty, friendship or because they are on the Prime Minister's wing of the party. To identify the quality effect we compare the effect of rank for ministers serving under a Prime Minister in her first term with those serving under Prime Ministers with consecutive terms. Again we find broadly similar effects of rank for both samples which suggests that rank affects 15 Full cabinet ministers are the baseline in this model. durability as it is a signal of ministerial quality rather than of personal or political aspects of the minister's relationships with the premier.
In the final column of Table 3 we include a fixed effect for each Prime Ministerial term.
This strategy allows us to take account of the fact that the same Prime Minister may be faced with very different challenges in different terms of his or her premiership. We find that controlling for these additional factors yields no significant differences in our estimates.
Our results with regard to the effect of experience combined with the effect of returning to government warrant some further discussion. One would normally expect to find durability increasing with experience, as one might think that experience is correlated with competence.
But being in government for a long time is not necessarily the same as proving to be an able minister in power. It is true that ministers discarded at the lower ranks are likely to have proved incapable of holding more senior positions; perhaps they are deemed unconvincing as performers in the House, in the media, unable to make decisions or simply have few supporters in the party. But attaining higher office might also reveal flaws in these regards that were not apparent at the lower levels.
The results we obtain on employment of ministers differ from those obtained in almost all econometric studies of the labour market. These show workers' durability increasing with experience and it is argued that experience shows that the worker is good enough to retain his job. The ministerial job market is unlike others in that every so often ministers lose their jobs through no fault exclusively theirs. If fault exists when a government loses power it is a collective one, and there might be individual ministers that the public still feel are best people for the job. When that party gets back into power those ministers who were good (and have not retired from politics) are more likely to find themselves in the government than those who were not so able. One way of thinking about this issue is to consider an employer who goes out of business. If the firm was able to reconstitute itself four years later through some new investment it might look to re-employ some of its old workforce. However, a discerning employer would not simply rehire old workers because of their experience, but rather hire those who had proved to be good at their jobs whereas they might look to new blood to replace workers who had not seemed so able. There might be workers who were not so incompetent that they could be fired, but they might not have been so efficient that the employer would rush to rehire them. In all, we should not be surprised to find that it is returning to government, rather than experience, which affects a ministers durability.
[ Table 4 about here]
In the first two columns of Table 4 we present estimates for the model which include the same explanatory variables but where the sample is broken down by the party identity of the minister. The estimates shown in column 1 are derived from the sample containing only Labour ministers and the estimates in column 2 pertain to the sample of Conservative ministers. For both samples we find that educational background and experience add little to durability. However, Labour ministers have a 56 percent reduction in the hazard rate upon returning to government whereas this effect is only 33 percent for Conservative ministers. We also find a significant difference in the effect of ministerial rank. Amongst Labour ministers the lowest ranking have a hazard rate 74 percent higher than the highest ranking but there are no significant effects further up the ministerial ladder. For Conservative ministers by contrast, the hazard rate of the lowest ranking ministers is 300 percent higher with significant effects of large magnitude also discernible for higher ranking ministers.
Breaking down the sample in this way shows the significance of both composition and partisan effects in our results. The effects of the background variables are entirely due to the partisan differences in government composition and thus do not appear when the sample is broken down by party. Ministerial rank also works through a partisan channel with higher rank offering less protection to ministers under Labour governments than Conservative ones.
The partisan channel may well reflect underlying latent attitudes in these parties. The Conservative party has traditionally been the more hierarchical party and election of the leader by backbenchers was not established until 1965.
We also find a partisan interaction on the effect of rank. The magnitude of the increase in durability due to higher ministerial rank is far greater for Conservative ministers than Labour ones. Whereas the Conservative party has traditionally been based on principles of hierarchy, the Labour party has traditionally maintained an egalitarian organisational ethos. In the Conservative party when the party is in government it has been less troubled by the actions of its backbenchers than the Labour party has been when it is the party of government. These partisan effects upon the impact of rank on ministerial durability, appears to reflect these underlying organisational values.
In the third column of Table 4 we have included a dummy variable for those ministers who are enobled at the time when they enter government. Being in the House of Lords might have various effects. On the one hand as peers do not face re-election pressures they might have greater durability, and the Lords may receive less hostile scrutiny both within its confines and from the press than the hothouse of the Commons. On the other hand governments may find it difficult to identify competent peers to represent them in the Lords. However we find no effect of nobility on ministerial duration.
Some of the straightforward features of the resignation process also interact in interesting ways. For example, in column 4 we find that ministers returning to government have a lower hazard when the government majority is small. There are two reasons why this might be the case. First, when the government has a small majority it is even more important for it to have high-quality experienced ministers than when its majority is safe. Second, when the government majority is small it is better to have the most influential backbenchers -at least those who may cause trouble for the government -inside the government than out. 16 Finally, in column 5 we estimate the same model but include the Prime Minister as a minister in the sample. Including the Prime Minister has no effect on our results.
Conclusion
Using a unique data set of all ministerial movements in the UK 1945-97 we have examined ministerial duration using a set of variables which capture both individual characteristics of each minister as well as political features of the government in which s/he was a member.
Although the differences in ministerial duration reflect both the specific historical events which shaped each administration as well as the particular style of each Prime Minister with regard to her team of ministers, we have found that there exist key systematic indicators of duration.
Focussing on ministerial duration is important since it is likely to be a key indicator of a minister's quality. Our key results show that ministers of higher rank and those returning to government after a spell of absence have lower hazard rates. Our argument is not that lengthier durations indicate that returning ministers are of higher quality, or that the longer ministerial spells of higher ranking ministers reflect the higher quality of such ministers.
indicates that s/he is a higher quality type. Furthermore, this indicates that, when controlling for the peculiarities of each government, Prime Ministers generally use their powers of appointment and patronage wisely.
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